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The Stories We Must Tell: 
Ugandan Children and 
the Atrocities of the 
Lord's Resistance Army 
Rosa Ehrenreich 
ROUX springs forward and places himself before the marchers, his 
back to them, still with fettered arms. 
When will you learn to see 
When will you learn to take sidesl 
During the summer of 1997, I spent a short time in Uganda as a consultant 
for Human Rights Watch, interviewing children who had been abducted by 
a rebel group called the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and who had expe-
rienced almost unimaginable horror.2 Adjectives cannot convey the reality 
best associated with images of the Cambodian genocide, the Jewish 
Holocaust, and recent events in Bosnia/Herzegovina. Like the Khmer 
Rouge, the Nazis, and Radovan Karadzic's Bosnian Serb militia, the LRA 
employs a calculated brutality against northern Ugandan civilians, forcing 
them tci participate in atrocities against fellow citizens. The atrocities of the 
Lord's Resistance Army are on a much smaller scale, affecting thousands 
rather than millions. But this is little consolation to a child who has been 
forced, at gunpoint, to kill another child. Consider one girl's story: 
One boy tried to escape, but he was caught. They made him eat a mouth-
ful of red pepper, and five people were beating him. His hands were tied, 
and then they made us, the other new captives, kill him with a stick. I felt 
sick. I knew this boy from before. We were from the same village. I 
refused to kill him and they told me they would shoot me. They pointed a 
gun at me, so I had to do it. The boy was asking me, "Why are you doing 
this?" I said I had no choice. After we killed him, they made us smear his 
blood on our arms .... I still dream about the boy from my village who I 
killed. I see him in my dreams, and he is talking to me and saying I killed 
him for nothing, and I am crying.3 
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How do you respond to a child who tells you a story like this? What do you 
say when the child breaks down in midstory and starts to cry? 
This essay is about stories-the stories that we are told and the stories 
that we, in turn, tell to others. It has become a truism that we have lost our 
faith in master narratives and that the "real" is composed of many compet-
ing narratives, all fragmentary, contradictory, overlapping. In this article, I 
discuss the problems this view poses for those of us who see ourselves as 
advocates and activists rather than solely-or primarily-as scholars, but 
who nonetheless seek to combine social activism with intellectual rigor and 
honesty. In particular, I discuss the dilemmas this creates for the human 
rights activist, who is committed both to acknowledging diverse cultures, 
with all their internal complexity, and to being a strong advocate for change 
on behalf of those whose rights are trampled. (I am not unaware of the 
problematic nature of the terms I have just used; to speak blithely of "cul-
tures"-and, indeed, to speak of "rights"-is to enter into dangerous terri-
tory.) 
I begin by discussing the decade-old conflict in northern Uganda 
between the government and the LRA.4 After briefly providing background 
information on the conflict, I describe the many contradictory stories I 
heard during my time in Uganda about the reasons for the conflict's persis-
tence. I discuss the difficulty of assessing these competing narratives, as 
well as the impossibility of ever getting at the "truth" about the conflict. I 
then turn to the stories of children who have survived months or years in 
rebel captivity, and I end by discussing the ways in which these highly per-
sonal narratives force us to insist that some things, at least, are absolute. 
The Conflict in Northern Uganda 
The LRA rebels have sown devastation and death throughout Uganda's 
northernmost districts. The rebel leader, Joseph Kony, claims to be in direct 
communication with the Holy Spirit, and Western newspaper reports have 
quoted Kony as insisting that his rebels will fight until they establish a 
Ugandan government based upon the Ten Commandments.s Other sources 
report that the rebels, most of whom are Acholi-an ethnic group concen-
trated on the northern border of Uganda-seek to free the Acholi people 
from rule by other ethnic groups that dominate President Yoweri 
Museveni 's government. 6 
The LRA's Ugandan rebels, who are based primarily in southern 
Sudan, receive arms and other aid from the Sudanese government and they 
make frequent incursions into the border districts of northern Uganda to 
attack government installations; to loot homes, stores, and health clinics; 
and to burn schools and huts. Civilians unlucky enough to get in the way 
often end up mutilated or dead.7 But what makes this conflict unusually 
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vicious-even for this troubled region-is that the LRA rebels target young 
children for abduction, virtual enslavement, and even deathS-all part of 
their campaign of civil terror and as a principal means of military recruit-
ment. Children as young as eight are abducted from their homes and 
schools and are used as beasts of burden and forced to march through the 
bush carrying the rebels' looted goods. Those children who protest or who 
cannot keep up with the march are killed, and captive postpubescent girls 
are given as "wives" to rebel commanders. When children are caught trying 
to escape, the rebels force other newly abducted children to beat or hack to 
death their less fortunate peers. 
The rebels generally march the children back across the border to base 
camps in southern Sudan. Due to drought and food shortages, many chil-
dren die of dysentery, malnutrition, or dehydration before ever reaching 
Sudan. Once in the LRA camps, the children-both boys and girls-are 
given rudimentary military training and are then forced into combat against 
both Ugandan government soldiers and-at the behest of the Sudanese gov-
ernment-the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Since the 
children make up the front lines in battles with the Ugandan army, they 
often end up being killed by bullets of Ugandan government soldiers. 
While an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 children have managed to escape 
from rebel captivity over the past two years, an unknown number remain in 
captivity or have died. But even those children fortunate enough to escape 
find that their ordeal is far from over, as they often suffer from severe emo-
tional and psychological trauma, malnourishment, disease, and physical 
injuries. Since many children have lost their parents during the conflict, 
they must also provide for their own food, clothing, and shelter. Survival 
prospects, however, are bleak in war-wracked northern Uganda. Conflict 
has destroyed the economy, the health care system, and the region's agri-
cultural base. 
As a result, northern Uganda now faces an acute humanitarian crisis. 
The government has urged civilians to leave their rural homes and to move 
to "protected camps" near government army installations. Tens of thou-
sands of people have obeyed the government injunction and have set up 
temporary homes in the camps (many claiming that government coercion 
left them with very little choice). As of August 1997, there were well over 
200,000 internally displaced people in the region, including those in the 
protected camps.9 Crowded conditions, lack of food, and inadequate sanita-
tion and health care facilities have led to thousands of deaths each month_lo 
These problems have been compounded by rebel attacks on civilians in the 
camps. Every week brings new reports of child abductions, and although 
the conflict has been going on for over a decade, the Ugandan government 
seems utterly unable to come up with a strategy for protecting children 
from adbuction. The LRA poses no real threat to the stability of Yoweri 
Museveni's administration in Kampala, but government attempts to combat 
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the rebels militarily have met with little success in the many years of skir-
mishing. (Like the hydra, the Lord's Resistance Army finds it easy to grow 
new heads, especially when the heads are those of replaceable child cap-
tives.) 
Most northern Ugandans, however, appear bewildered and numbed by 
the conflict's persistence; there seems to be no good reason for the rebels to 
slaughter their fellow Acholi, no reason for them to target young children, 
no reason to keep fighting an unwinnable war that causes terrible suffering 
to the very people on whose behalf the rebels claim to be fighting. Indeed, 
what are the rebels fighting for? Is this an ideological struggle? A religious 
struggle? An ethnic struggle?ll And why has the Ugandan govemment not 
managed to resolve the conflict and bring an end to the devastation of the 
north, and to the terrible plight of the region's children?I2 
These questions are not easily answered. To begin with, the rebels have 
no obvious spokespersons. Unlike the Irish Republican Army (IRA), they 
have no "political wing," which makes public pronouncements and negotia-
tions difficult. When individuals occasionally do come forward to represent 
the LRA, their legitimacy and reliability are dubious.B Yet the rebels are 
clearly capable of acting in an efficient and coordinated manner; they use 
land mines and automatic weapons, and they stay in touch with each other 
while in the bush through an extensive radio network. But they have appar-
ently chosen to be silent-or, at any rate, extraordinarily vague-about 
their motivations and aims. 14 If they have a political program, no one seems 
to know what it is. 
The clear majority of northern civilians call for a peaceful, negotiated 
end to the fighting, which has left virtually no one untouched.15 In fact, the 
military approach to fighting the rebels has actually succeeded in killing 
more children, since the rebels force captive children into combat. 
Nonetheless, the Ugandan government seems to be determined to pur-
sue a military end to the conflict, claiming that no other solution is possi-
ble. After all, you cannot negotiate peace with someone you cannot find, 
and the rebels are generally nowhere to be found. Since the rebels seem to 
have no political agenda (so the government insists at any rate), the issues 
to negotiate are unclear. Additionally, the govemment is unwilling to nego-
tiate with criminals and human rights abusers, claiming that the rebels 
might want amnesty and that gross human rights violations should not go 
unpunished. There is no obvious way out of the current deadlock. 
The Stories We Hear 
Explanatory Narratives 
During my stay in Uganda, I was accompanied by a Human Rights Watch 
colleague, and together we conducted several dozen background interviews 
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with journalists, nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives, and 
government officials. Not surprisingly, we found little consensus among 
our interviewees as to why the conflict persists. Although theories abound-
ed (some more plausible than others), none were wholly satisfying. By the 
end of our stay, the conflict's origins and persistence were no more clear 
than when we arrived. We carne looking for reasons~ we left with nothing 
more than a set of stories. 
The explanatory narratives we encountered fell into several broad cate-
gories, but there were five metastories that predominated. I will call them, 
for the sake of my own narrative, the insanity theory. the anthropological 
theory, the government theory. the ethnicity theory, and the geopolitical 
conspiracy theory. It could of course be argued that by presenting these sto-
ries in such an artificial fashion-as if there are truly five distinct and 
monolithic schools of thought about the conflict-1 am presenting a distort-
ed picture, one that is far too simplistic to reflect the many diverse and 
nuanced explanations of the conflict. I plead guilty as charged. 
The Insanity Theory 
"Why are the rebels doing such terrible things to their own people?" By far 
the most common answer we received was a simple one: ''They're crazy."I6 
The explanation goes like this: 
The rebels are crazy. Only insane people would stay in the bush for ten 
years and claim to be in direct contact with the Holy Spirit. Only insane 
people would believe that a small group, isolated in one geographic area, 
has a chance of toppling a national government. Only insane people 
would terrorize people from their own ethnic group, the very people on 
whose behalf the rebels claim to be fighting. Only insane people would 
commit such atrocities as cutting off people's limbs and forcing children 
to hack to death other children. It's useless to try to determine the "rea~ 
sons" for the rebels' behavior, because there are no reasons. 
This is clearly not a satisfying explanation. While isolated incidents of bru-
tality can be dismissed as evidence of a perpetrator's "'craziness," it is hard-
ly useful to categorize as insane the actions of large groups. Hundreds, per-
haps thousands. of people do not act in a coordinated way without reasons 
that seem to be~to them at least--compelling. 
A variant of the insanity explanation-and the one that prevails in most 
Western media articles about the Lord's Resistance Army--draws on what 
we might call the "Heart of Darkness" paradigm. It runs something like 
this: 
The rebels of the so-called Lord's Resistance Anny are cult fanatics, com-
bining a naive and literal-minded understanding of religion with an inhu-
man level of brutality. Their behavior is both savage and bizarre. But such 
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bizarre behavior is hardly unprecedented in this region of Africa, which 
has, over the years, seen many similar outpourings of savagery. 17 
This explanation is an all too familiar one; the conflict is bizarre, but Africa 
is simply Like That. Like the "they're crazy" theory, this explanation is 
readily rejected; it presents an ahistorical and decontextualized version of 
events, and the resulting story lends credence to the notion that in Africa, 
savagery is what outsiders should expect, and efforts to change things are 
consequently in vain. 
The Anthropological Theory 
Few anthropologists have written about the conflict in northern Uganda, 
and the little work that has been done is based mostly on research conduct-
ed in the late 1980s before the widespread atrocities against children began. 
Perhaps for this reason, most anthropological commentators paint what 
appears to be a more sympathetic picture of the conflict's protagonists. 18 
The anthropological version of the story is longer and far more nuanced 
than the stories we have examined so far, and I will not be able to do it jus-
tice here. Nonetheless, the version goes something like this: 
When the British arrived in Uganda, they viewed pastoralist northern peo-
ples, such as the Acholi, as less evolved than the peoples of the south and 
west, who had settled, agricultural societies. As a result, colonial civil ser-
vice jobs went to southerners, while the more "primitive" and "war-like" 
northerners were recruited into the colonial armed forces. Consequently, 
the south of Uganda became better developed economically and northern-
ers came to dominate the military. This colonially created socioeconomic 
division between north and south solidified after independence, when fre-
quent bouts of political violence often followed (or were declared to be 
following) ethnic lines. In the decades since independence, the Acholi 
have been both victims and perpetrators of this violence. 19 
When Museveni came to power by defeating the Acholi general Tito 
Okello in 1986, many of Okello 's Acholi soldiers fled north to their home 
districts along the Sudanese border. Some of the fleeing Acholi soldiers 
crossed into Sudan, fearing that if they remained in Uganda, they would 
face retaliation from Museveni 's soldiers, many of whom viewed the 
Acholi as complicit in the atrocities of past regimes. The defeated Acholi 
soldiers later joined up with other opponents of Museveni and formed a 
rebel alliance. The bloodshed and violence of Uganda's postindependence 
decades made many Acholi fear that it was kill or be killed; if Museveni 
was not overthrown, they believed his soldiers would destroy the Acholi. 
One of the rebel leaders was Alice Lakwena, an Acholi prophetess 
and healer. Over the years, traditional Acholi beliefs in jogi (supernatural 
forces) had had a Christian matrix imposed upon them by the teachings of 
Western missionaries, and Alice Lakwena was one of the many Acholi 
who interpreted Christian doctrine in a uniquely Acholi way, combining 
professions of faith in Catholicism with a belief in spirit possession and 
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witchcraft. Lakwena promised her Acholi followers that the Holy Spirit 
(Tipu Maleng) would help them overthrow Museveni, and that they should 
also purify the Acholi community from within by eliminating witches 
(using violence when necessary). 
The Acholi, gloomy after their military defeat by Museveni and filled 
with guilt because of their role in the abuses of previous regimes, readily 
embraced Lakwena's millenarian promises. In 1987, she led an army of 
thousands of Acholi against Museveni's soldiers. She had some of her 
"followers" abducted or coerced into her army, justifying such action as 
for their own good. Still, Lakwena gained enormous popular support 
among the Acholi. She promised that the Holy Spirit would protect her 
true followers from enemy bullets. Believing her words, many Acholi 
marched against Museveni armed only with sticks. 
The modern weapons of Museveni 's soldiers handily defeated 
Lakwena's army. She fled to Kenya, and the rebel alliance more or less 
disintegrated. But Joseph Kony, a young relation of Lakwena's, remained 
in the bush with a small band of followers. Kony claimed to have inherit-
ed Lakwena 's spiritual power and, for a time, he too garnered much popu-
lar support; large crowds would turn out to hear him speak. He eventually 
rechristened his band of supporters the Lord's Resistance Army, and he 
and his rebels continued to fight to overthrow Museveni and to purify the 
Acholi from within. 
While Kony's activities may seem bizarre to outsiders, they in fact 
form part of a coherent belief system. Kony has vowed to rid the Acholi of 
witches and believes that killing a witch is not a wrongful act in the same 
way that killing a person is wrongful. The rebels kill those they believe 
are working with evil spirits. The rebels view the conflict through the 
lenses of religion and ethnicity. From such a perspective, all those not 
with Kony are against him, and anyone against Kony-and, by implica-
tion, against the Holy Spirit-must be working with evil spirits. Thus, the 
apparently senseless violence against civilians, though tragic, is not sense-
less when viewed in context. 
Condensed as this account is, it is clearly much richer and more com-
plex than the insanity theory. Because it is more nuanced, it might be more 
persuasive. But is it a little too pat? Are simpler explanations sometimes 
better? And how do we interpret such an account? Are we willing to say 
that brutal violence ever makes sense? Is there any moral universe in which 
forcing children to kill other children could be acceptable? 
The children who have escaped from the rebels tell of numerous rituals 
involving water, stones, special prayers, and medicines. Such reports sug-
gest that the rebels remain motivated by a variant of Alice Lakwena's mil-
lenarian beliefs.2o Over the years, rebel leaders who left or died were 
replaced by captive children, some of whom-abducted when very 
young-have now been with the rebels for years. Even if the rebel leaders 
believe that what they are doing is morally justifiable and reflects the will 
of the Holy Spirit, do the captive children believe in Kony's spiritual (as 
opposed to earthly and coercive) powers? 
The escaped children we spoke to were disbelievers more or less by 
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definition, since they had persisted in escape plans even after being told 
that the Holy Spirit punishes children who try to escape. But what about the 
children who remain with the rebels? Forced to commit atrocities them-
selves, and powerless against the superior force of their captors, do they 
come to believe in Kony's words as a form of psychic survival-the only 
way to live with oneself when one has become complicit in atrocities? To 
the extent that captive children may come to believe in Kony's supernatural 
powers, whether out of fear or guilt, does this alter the nature of the rebels' 
beliefs? If a number of "the rebels" are indeed former child captives, what 
does it mean to speak of "the rebels," much less of what they "believe"? 
The Government's Theory 
Not surprisingly, most Ugandan government spokespersons give little cre-
dence to the notion that the rebels are true, if misguided, believers. The 
official government explanation, which presents rebel leaders as cynical 
and manipulative, can be easily summarized: 
It is nonsense to imagine that religion has anything to do with the conflict 
in the north. Ugandans don't believe in witchcraft anymore. It's also non-
sense to believe that Kony has a political agenda of some sort, or any 
legitimate grievances. The bloodshed of Uganda's past is over, and the 
Acholi are valued members of our nation. 
This is about pure greed on the part of Joseph Kony, who is a tool of 
the Sudanese government. They give him money, weapons and cars; in 
exchange, his army helps them fight against John Garang's Sudan 
People's Liberation Army. Simply put, Kony is a Sudanese mercenary, a 
hired gun. If he returned to Uganda as an ordinary civilian, he would have 
no money, prestige, or power, and neither would his commanders. In order 
to have an army, Kony needs to abduct children, since his brutal methods 
have ensured that no sane civilian would join him voluntarily. And chil-
dren are much easier to manipulate and control than adults. 
The conflict persists because of Kony 's greed. As long as he is aided 
by Sudan, it is very hard for the government of Uganda to defeat him 
completely. He isn't really interested in fighting against the Ugandan 
army; in fact, he usually flees back to Sudan when they come after him, 
and it is hard for our troops to follow. 
Kony is not a revolutionary but a bandit. The government is doing all 
it can to fight him, but it's very difficult; his rebels come and go, and the 
border with Sudan is long and difficult to defend.21 
The Ethnicity Theory 
In a previous issue of Africa Today, David Newbury draws our attention to 
the ways in which press accounts of the Rwandan genocide distorted the 
realities of Rwandan politics and history by insisting that the genocide 
resulted from "centuries of tribal conflict. "22 In the case of Uganda, it is 
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also tempting to make generalizations about deeply rooted ethnic conflicts 
and entirely ignore the ways in which ethnicity has been created and 
manipulated, as much as discovered. Nonetheless, many Ugandans today 
interpret political events-or at least certain kinds of political events-in 
terms of ethnicity. Many of the Acholi people we interviewed, for example, 
viewed the conflict as part of a conspiracy to destroy their people. That 
story goes like this: 
When the British came, they gave the best jobs and provided the best edu-
cation to ethnic groups in the south and west. But southemers and west-
erners, though wealthy and well educated, were not strong or brave, 
unlike the northerners. Consequently, when Milton Obote, a Langi, 
became Uganda's first president, he relied on the northern Langi and 
Acholi tribes to form his army. When Idi Amin took power, he was afraid 
of the Acholi 's power within the army and subsequently slaughtered many 
of them. After Amin fell, Obote returned to power and again relied on the 
Acholi to be the backbone of his army, although he also feared them. 
Thus, he deliberately sent them into situations in which they would likely 
be killed. As a result, the Acholi died disproportionately during the war 
against Museveni 's army. 
Since Obote always sent Acholi to fight Museveni, his soldiers saw 
them as their enemy and held them responsible for everything bad that 
happened. When the Acholi could take no more of Obote 's insults and 
threats, the Acholi general Tito Okello finally ousted him. Okello would 
have set up a true democracy, but Museveni-after signing a peace 
accord-broke the agreement and continued the war, eventually defeating 
Okello. The Acholi had to flee to the north to avoid Museveni 's vengeful 
soldiers. 23 
At this point, the narrative branches, and we get two divergent explanations 
of the current conflict and why it has persisted. The first is the more 
extreme: 
The Acholi have never wanted anything but peace, and it is slanderous to 
say that Acholi rebels are slaughtering Acholi civilians. The so-called con-
flict in the north is part of a plot to destroy the Acholi that was hatched by 
Museveni 's government when it failed to destroy them through other, 
more straightforward means. There are no rebels; the so-called rebels are 
really government soldiers disguised as Acholi, that is why the army never 
succeeds in destroying them. They don't want to destroy the "rebels,'' 
because they are really their own men disguised so that they can kill more 
Acholi, while the Acholi themselves take the blamf'. Who has actually met 
Joseph Kony? How do we know he is still alive? True, captive children 
claim to have met him, but they only know what they are told. 
The second account, while less extreme, reflects a similar ethnic paranoia: 
The Acholi have long been a thorn in the government's side; they repre-
sent a potential military threat, since they formed the backbone of the 
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army that fought Museveni, and today they consistently vote against him 
in elections. 
The conflict in the north persists because the government really has 
no desire to end it. Many generals are getting rich off the war because 
there's a tremendous amount of corruption and incompetence. Being one 
of Africa's most successful guerrilla leaders, surely Museveni could elimi-
nate a tiny group of rebels if he really tried to do so. 
But after all, why should the government try hard to destroy the 
rebels? For the most part, it is Acholi destroying Acholi; the rebels do lit-
tle damage to the government, but they kill and abduct many civilians. 
The government hates the Acholi and wants us to destroy ourselves, so 
they do not intervene to end this conflict. Fighting against the rebels is 
also designed to kill the Acholi, since the government knows full well that 
most of the rebels' soldiers are captive Acholi children.24 
The Geopolitical Conspiracy Theory 
In addition to conspiracy theories stemming from ethnic paranoia, there is 
also an elaborate geopolitical conspiracy theory. This explanation of the 
conflict-favored by many northern politicians-has two versions. The 
first states that the conflict with the rebels is simply a proxy war for the 
Ugandan government's undeclared war against Sudan: 
Since the late 1960s, when both were students at the University of Dar es 
Salaam, Yoweri Museveni has been a close friend of SPLA leader John 
Garang and thus wants to help him overthrow the Sudanese government. 
For political reasons, he can't come out and openly aid Garang, since an 
all-out war between Uganda and Sudan would be disastrous. 
Consequently, he is covertly supplying Garang with arms, money, and 
even Ugandan soldiers. The Sudanese government is naturally angry at 
Ugandan attempts to destabilize Sudan and, in return, they have started to 
aid Kony's army. It's a simple tit for tat; you help our rebels, we'll help 
yours! In addition, Sudan uses the LRA as a mercenary army to fight 
against the SPLA. 
This conflict is not about religion or the LRA's political agenda; it is 
simply about Ugandan-Sudanese relations. The conflict drags on because 
the Ugandan government refuses to stop supporting the SPLA (support 
that it does not even acknowledge). The conflict in the north won't end 
until Uganda and Sudan resolve their differences and there is genuine 
peace between these two governments. In the meantime, the Acholi peo-
ple~and especially the Acholi children~are caught in the middle of a 
quarrel between two governments-a quarrel they did not create and can-
not end. The Ugandan government is sacrificing the Acholi to its quarrel 
with Sudan.25 
A more elaborate version of this narrative ts voiced by opponents of 
Museveni: 
This is about more than just Sudan; it is about Museveni's Napoleonic 
ambitions. He has his finger in every pie in the region~giving covert aid 
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to allies in Rwanda, Burundi, and Ethiopia (as well as Sudan), and every-
one knows that he was behind Laurent Kabila's rebel movement in the 
former Zaire. Being head of a poor country, Museveni can't get approval 
from parliament for covert funding for his friends in neighboring coun-
tries. Parliament would say, "No, feed your people first!" The conflict in 
the north, however, provides a handy excuse for endless amounts of mili-
tary spending, which parliament does approve. But little of this money or 
equipment ever reaches the north. Instead, it goes all over Africa. Thus, 
the conflict in the north drags on, since Museveni has no incentive to end 
it because it's a convenient cover for his covert activities. As a result, 
Acholi children are being sacrificed to Museveni 's geopolitical 
ambitions.26 
Assessing Competing Narratives 
Given the various competing narratives regarding the conflict's origins and 
persistence, how can we discern "the truth" about the conflict? On the one 
hand, some of these narratives clearly have more plausibility than others; 
they accord more or less well with events we know to have occurred and 
with information from sources we consider to be "reliable." Thus, we can 
readily reject the insanity theory and regard the genocide theory with 
extreme skepticism.27 But what about the other theories? How should we 
assess these narratives, each of which has a certain plausibility, a certain 
internal coherence and integrity? 
We cannot find the rebel leaders to ask their opinion, and even if we 
could, it is unlikely that they would do more than present us with their own 
narratives. We cannot know what really motivates them, just as we cannot 
know what really goes on in the minds of the government leaders. In short, 
we cannot really know much of anything at all. It is not, of course, impossi-
ble to gain some greater understanding of the conflict. With time, we might 
amass additional evidence to support one of the theories (do people in 
Burundi use weapons manufactured in Ugandan munitions plants? are there 
witnesses who can report on statements made by high government offi-
cials?), but given the ongoing crisis in the north, time is something we do 
not have. 
Having spent only a short time in Uganda, I am not as well equipped to 
assess the various stories and theories as those who have spent months or 
years there. Lack of sufficient time and knowledge is often a problem with 
human rights monitoring, since human rights groups tend to be underfund-
ed and understaffed. Much of the time, human rights groups notice prob-
lems only when they reach catastrophic proportions. Weighing conflicting 
accounts would obviously be easier if rights groups had a more sustained 
involvement in different issues and regions; but lack of resources-_-not lack 
of will-often prevents them from doing so. The world is filled with 
tragedies, and when resources are limited, a crisis mentality prevails, and 
only the tragedies that are ongoing and egregious get much attention. But 
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even if we had sufficient resources, we would not be able to fully resolve 
the dilemma of assessing competing narratives. Too much will always be 
inaccessible to us and we will never have full information. We are always 
guessing. 
These observations, of course, are hardly original; what I am saying 
about the crisis in northern Uganda is equally true of most other conflicts in 
the world, and the dilemma of understanding the roots of such a conflict 
is one that is familiar to all historians, anthropologists, and political scien-
tists. From a scholarly point of view, this is not necessarily a dilemma. 
In fact, it is interesting, because it confirms the richness, the complexity, 
and the layered quality of events. We do not know, and probably cannot 
know, the "truth" about why the conflict began and why it continues. Life 
consists of stories, some more persuasive than others, but all are, to some 
extent, irreducible and nonfalsifiable. To the scholar with even the slightest 
postmodern bent, this is as it must be, and as it should be. 
Personal Narratives: The Children's Stories 
The explanatory narratives just examined invite us to be skeptical about the 
possibility of constructing a master narrative to explain events in northern 
Uganda. And if the conflict constituted "history" rather than "current 
events," we might be able to stop right here, with a satisfying set of reflec-
tions about the partial and contingent nature of historical "truth." 
But in addition to these explanatory narratives, one also encounters 
personal narratives-namely, the narratives of the children we interviewed 
who had been abducted by the rebels but who ultimately managed to 
escape. Like the plethora of explanatory narratives, the children's stories 
must also be reckoned with. Should these personal narratives have the same 
status as explanatory narratives? To answer this question, we need to exam-
ine some of the children's stories. 
My colleague Yodon Thonden and I interviewed twenty-eight children 
during our stay in Uganda. We interviewed children at two World Vision 
trauma counseling centers, one in Kiryandongo (outside the conflict zone) 
and one in Gulu town (in the conflict zone). We also interviewed children 
at the Gulu Save the Children Organization's (GUS CO) trauma counseling 
center in Gulu town, at St. Mary's School in Aboke, and at the barracks of 
the Uganda People's Defense Force in Gulu. 
The children came from a range of social backgrounds. While some 
were from educated professional families (particularly the girls from St. 
Mary's), others-like most of the children at World Vision and GUSCO-
were from small rural villages, the children of uneducated farmers. Most of 
the children we met had some schooling before being abducted, but anum-
ber of the children told us that before their abduction, their schools had 
been destroyed or closed as a result of rebel activity. (The LRA rebels tar-
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get schools-and often abduct schoolchildren en masse-probably in part 
because schools are simply an excellent place to find lots of children. Some 
of the children, however, told us that the rebels intentionally abduct some 
well-educated children to serve as nurses and future leaders.) The rebels 
primarily stage abductions in Gulu and Kitgum, homeland of the Acholi, 
and most of the children we met were from that ethnic group. But a few of 
the children were from other ethnic groups and had been abducted in the 
neighboring district of Apac. Some of the children had been with the rebels 
for short periods (one to two months), while others had been in captivity 
for several years. Similarly, some of the children we met had escaped 
months before, while others, such as a boy I interviewed in the army bar-
racks in Gulu, had escaped only days before. In several cases, we found (to 
our great discomfort) that we were the very first people to "debrief'' chil-
dren after their escape-the trauma counseling centers being heavily under-
staffed. 
While a number of the older children spoke English, about two-thirds 
of our interviews were conducted with the assistance of interpreters. In 
most cases, the interpreters were also counselors at World Vision and 
GUSCO. Some children required virtually no urging to tell their stories; 
they simply launched into lengthy narratives, and we asked very few ques-
tions, except to clarify dates, place names, and so on. In other cases, we had 
to ask a long series of questions in order to elicit responses. 
It is difficult to know the degree to which the nature of our questions, 
our identities as U.S. human rights researchers, or the identities of the 
counselors (mostly Langi and Acholi social workers and nurses) affected 
the nature of the stories the children told us. We tried to be as conscious of 
these influences as possible, and we were careful not to ask leading ques-
tions. The stories the children told us are remarkably similar to those col-
lected by Amnesty International researchers, World Vision researchers, and 
a great many journalists, although the interviews were conducted with dif-
ferent children and interpreters at varying times during the last two years.28 
Also, children who had escaped only a few days before meeting us told sto-
ries that were very similar to those told by children who had escaped sever-
al weeks or months before. 
The report published by Human Rights Watch tells the children's sto-
ries in great detail.29 Here, for space reasons, I present only a few frag-
ments. I begin with a story about the moment of capture by the rebels. 
There had already been rumors that rebels were around, and we were very 
fearfuL My grandmother was hiding in the bush. It was morning, and I 
was practicing my music when I heard a shot. I started running into the 
bush, but there was a rebel hiding behind a tree. I thought he would shoot 
me. He said, "Stop, my friend, don't try to run away!" Then he beat me on 
my back with the handle of the gun. He ordered me to direct him, and told 
me that afterwards I would be released. 
But afterwards it was quite different. That afternoon we met up with 
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a very huge group of rebels, together with so many new captives. We 
marched and marched. Once we passed close to my homestead, but I was 
carefully guarded and I could do nothing. We came across a car which we 
ambushed, and later we came to a homestead and found a family with a 
father who was drunk. The rebels said, "This one is drunk, we cannot 
spare him!" So they clubbed him to death, then dragged him to a hut and 
burned it. As we went we burned many houses. I also recall that after we 
attacked a Kitgum trading center, we came across two hunters, and they 
were killed with clubs and bayonets. 
This looting and killing continued as we marched. So many people 
were killed. You had to adapt yourself quickly to that kind of life. 
(Charles, fifteen)30 
The youngest child we interviewed was William, aged ten: 
They beat us, then they made me carry some radios and carry the com-
mander's gun. It was heavy and at first I was afraid it would shoot off in 
my arms, but it was not filled with ammunition. We joined a big group 
and we walked very far, and my feet were very swollen. If you said that 
you were hurting they would say, "'Shall we give this young boy a rest?" 
But by a "rest" they meant they would kill you, so that if you did not wish 
to die you had to say you did not need a rest.31 
Many of the children we met told of being forced to kill other children. The 
rebels seem to make almost all child captives either participate in or watch 
the killing of other children; many children spoke of being told to stand in a 
semicircle around the child to be killed and of being forced to inflict at 
least one or two ritual blows: 
We walked and walked and they made us carry their property that they 
had looted. At about six a.m. they made us stop and they lined up in two 
lines, and made us walk between them while they kicked us. 
On the second day of marching our legs were swollen. They said, 
"Eh, now, what should we do about your legs? You must walk, or do you 
want us to kill you? It's your choice." So we kept going. 
On the third day a little girl tried to escape, and they made us kill her. 
They went to collect some big pieces of firewood. Then they kicked her 
and jumped on her, and they made us each beat her at least once with the 
big pieces of wood. They said, "You must beat and beat and beat her." She 
was bleeding from the mouth. Then she died. Then they made us lie down 
and they beat us with fifteen strokes each, because they said we had 
known she would try to escape. (Stella, fifteen)32 
The long, hungry days of marching through the bush also featured promi-
nently in the children's stories: 
After a time we received a radio message to go to Sudan [to the main 
LRA base camp]. We started marching and it became very dry. We could 
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not find water or food, and we ate the leaves of trees. Many became sick 
and died, and you would see children everywhere, lying down like they 
were sleeping. But they were dead. (Charles, fifteen)33 
Memories of combat also surfaced. Children told us that rebel commanders 
would often refuse to let the child soldiers take cover when going into bat-
tle, because taking cover was forbidden by the Holy Spirit, who would pro-
tect children who obeyed rebel leaders. 
After we crossed into Sudan ... we were trained how to attack vehicles, 
and how to shoot. ... I was given a gun: an AK-47. I had to carry it on my 
right shoulder at all times. It was so heavy. The loaded magazine made it 
so heavy. For a while, my right arm was paralyzed from the weight, and 
the skin on my shoulder burned from carrying it .... 
I was good at shooting. I went for several battles in Sudan. The sol-
diers on the other side would be squatting, but we would stand in a 
straight line. The commanders were behind us. They would tell us to run 
straight into gunfire. The commanders would stay behind and would beat 
those of us who would not run forward. You would just run forward shoot-
ing your gun. I don't know if I actually killed any people, because you 
really can't tell if you're shooting people or not. I might have killed peo-
ple in the course of the fighting ... I remember the first time I was in the 
front line. The other side started firing, and the commander ordered us to 
run towards the bullets. I panicked. I saw others falling down dead around 
me. The commanders were beating us for not running, for trying to crouch 
down. They said if we fall down, we would be shot and killed by the sol~ 
diers. 
In Sudan we were fighting the Dinkas, and other Sudanese civilians. 
I don't know why we were fighting them. We were just ordered to fight. 
(Timothy, fourteen)34 
And again: 
After training in Sudan, the rebels sent me back to Uganda. I was to be 
part of a group that would attack trading centers in Kitgum and abduct 
new children. I was well-armed, a soldier already. As we were returning, 
we were attacked by government soldiers. The frontline was somewhere 
ahead of where I was, and the commander said, "Run, run to the front-
line!" It didn't matter whether you had a gun or not. If you did not run 
they would beat you with sticks. Many children without guns had to run to 
the front. 
You are not allowed to appear to be thinking too much. If you had a 
gun, you had to be firing all the time or you weald be killed. And you 
were not allowed to take cover. The order from the Holy Spirit was not to 
take cover. You must have no fear, and stand up as you run into fire. This 
was because they said you would be protected by the Holy Spirit if you 
stood tall and had no fear. But if you took cover, the Holy Spirit would be 
angry and you would be shot dead by all the bullets. 
So many, so many were killed. (Charles, fifteen)35 
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Rape by commanders was mentioned by girls, but only elliptically; the 
euphemism was that the girls had been "given as wives": 
After the military training, I was given to a man called Otim. There were 
five women given to one man. The man I was given to was very rude to 
me: he thought I wanted to leave him and escape. He beat me many times 
with sticks. He thought I wanted to escape. Now I'm going to be a mother 
soon. 
I don't want to be a mother at this age. But it happened and I must 
accept this. (Sarah, seventeen)36 
None of the children we met seemed to have any real understanding of 
the rebels' aims and motivations. They frequently told us that the rebels 
wanted to "overthrow the government," and that Kony claimed to be doing 
the bidding of the Holy Spirit. Beyond that, the children could not go. 
It happens like this: Kony himself, he says he works with the Holy Spirit, 
and it talks to him, and he translates to the soldiers. So some days he says: 
''Today, you must bum the earth and kill the people." That is the reason 
the rebels make so much destruction. 
We used to question ourselves: this man, Kony, why is he sending us 
to go kill our brothers, our sisters, our fathers and mothers, to burn their 
houses, eat their food? Why are we having to do this? But there was no 
answer at all. We cannot see an answer to that question. (Stephen, seven-
teen)37 
All of the children spoke of their uncertainty about the future. Many of 
them had lost their parents in the conflict and did not know where to find 
other relatives. The fear of being lost and alone, with no one to support 
them, was coupled with a fear of rebel retaliation: 
I am afraid to go back home to my village, because the rebels are still 
there in plenty. I fear they will kill me if they come to know of me here. I 
was in primary three when I was abducted, and I would like to go back to 
·school, if there is somewhere that is safe. I don't know. I am sad now. The 
other thing I would like to say is that I experienced the deaths of many 
children. I wish there could be a solution. (William, ten)38 
There is no reason, really, to stop here; I could fill fifty pages with long 
quotes from children. But there is probably little need. We interviewed 
about thirty children during our stay in Uganda, and we soon came to see 
that each child's story was fundamentally the same. The essential elements 
were these: capture by the rebels; long, exhausting marches through the 
bush, on swollen feet, carrying heavy loads, and not having enough to eat 
or drink. The witnessing of atrocities. The forced participation in atrocities: 
usually killing another child. The fear and guilt. The military training, and 
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the bewilderment of going into combat and of adjusting to "that kind of 
life." For girls, the rape. And finally, the escape. 
The very sameness and simplicity of the children's stories gave them a 
terrible power. Like the words of a half-forgotten fairy tale, they seemed 
somehow archetypal, striking a deep chord. "We walked and walked ... I 
was hungry ... after a time we came to a village ... I was afraid." The 
world reflected in the stories is indeed a child's world. Here we have no 
grand theories, no stories of geopolitical affairs or genocidal plots. We have 
only a world of direct, personal experience, of events that slide out of con-
trol, of long days and nights lost in the bush, of hunger, of powerful, fright-
ening figures who can hurt and who can kill. 
At the same time that their very similarity gives them power, each 
child's story is fundamentally unique. The outlines are the same; the details 
are different. One child recalls the way the heavy gun burned the skin on 
his shoulder; another recalls the blood that dripped from the mouth of a girl 
she helped kill. The only possible response to the children's stories is heart-
sickness, and it is hard to say whether it is the stories' similarities or their 
differences that most linger in the mind. 
The Stories We Tell 
Up until now, I have been discussing the stories that we-as scholars and 
activists-are told. I want to turn now from these stories to the stories that 
we, in our turn, tell to others. 
This is where the scholar and the activist often part company. If the 
explanatory narratives I described earlier each have their own coherence 
and integrity-if it is impossible to reduce the multiplicity of explanatory 
narratives to a single master narrative-the children's narratives are irre-
ducible in a different sort of way. There is nothing we can do with them; 
they will not disappear. Instead, they take us by the shoulders, they shake 
us and demand a response, some sort of action. Some stories demand that 
we establish a master narrative of our own or, at any rate, a sort of hierar-
chy of narratives. If a legitimate response to the multiplicity of explanatory 
narratives is to make a statement about the fragmentary and contested 
nature of "reality" and the elusiveness of historical truth, the only legiti-
mate response to the personal narratives of the children is to take action to 
find a solution, now. And in some unavoidable sense, "finding a solution" 
requires us to insist on some absolutes and to construct a master narrative 
of the sort we know to be fallible and suspect. 
Few of us are solely scholars or solely activists; this is in many ways a 
false opposition. Few of us care so little about the human pain all around us 
that we can shrug off our inability to find clear-cut answers, declaring all 
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master narratives false, unnecessary, and irrelevant. And few of us are so 
bent upon a life of action and passion that we fail to see the complexities 
that make passion and action morally and intellectually risky. Most of us 
struggle to reconcile the two roles, and we may find ourselves continually 
shifting roles. 
But as a human rights lawyer and a sometime student of anthropology, 
I find the dilemma to be none the less real, for the role of the anthropologist 
and the role of the lawyer do not sit well together here. The anthropologist 
is concerned with presenting an honest and nuanced view of people, cul-
tures, and events-a view that does not impose an outside value system on 
others but faithfully reflects all the complexity and ambiguity of life. The 
lawyer, on the other hand, is fundamentally an advocate, not a neutral 
observer. We all know, from the courtroom dramas that saturate our media, 
that the lawyer's job-perhaps the lawyer's own legal and ethical obliga-
tion-is to present a narrative that will crowd out all other narratives and 
reduce chaos and multiplicity to a unitary, coherent, and powerful story.39 
While the human rights lawyer is not as much of a performer as a trial 
advocate, the job is still-fundamentally-to tell a single story. The 
"client" is not a plaintiff or a defendant in court but a person or, more often, 
a group of people who are suffering. When faced with the question, "Why 
are these abuses occurring?" the human rights advocate cannot say some-
thing vague about contested narratives and the multiplicity of meanings. 
Things must be boiled down, simplified; generalizations must be made. 
And the stories we tell matter greatly, for some stories-perhaps all sto-
ries-produce action, rather than just more stories. If we believe anything 
at all, we have to believe that some actions may provide comfort and help, 
while others may cause discord and pain. Most of us naturally prefer posi-
tive action, but categorizing all the possible actions that might be taken is 
not easy and requires us to choose between the stories we have been told. 
The link between the word and the deed is often obscure, but it is there. 
And so we must favor some stories over others. 
If the Ugandan government is in fact out to get the Acholi, for exam-
ple, we need to call for action to combat the government's policies. But if 
the government wants to protect Acholi civilians but lacks the resources, a 
much different response is required. If the government finds supporting the 
SPLA's struggle against the repressive Sudanese government more impor-
tant than stopping atrocities against northern civilians, a different response 
is again in order.40 The mode of negotiating with the rebels would also dif-
fer depending on whether Joseph Kony is actually motivated by greed or if 
he is motivated by religious fervor. 
How much weight we give each explanatory narrative affects our ideas 
about potential solutions to the human rights abuses in northern Uganda. In 
turn, our ideas about solutions affect the kind of stories we tell about events 
there, since how we frame our stories will influence readers and determine 
whether they agree with our proposed solutions and whether they feel 
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inclined to help us reach those goals. But for many reasons, we are not free 
to tell our stories any way we please; we must also accept certain con-
straints on our storytelling. 
My task during my visit to Uganda was to produce a report for Human 
Rights Watch. These reports, as many readers will know, have a fairly stan-
dard format; they are bound, generally eighty to 200 pages; they begin with 
a "Summary and Recommendations" section, then usually move into a sec-
tion on historical and legal background; they go on to discuss "findings" in 
more detail and include, at some point, an analysis of those international 
human rights and humanitarian standards that have been violated and in 
precisely what way. Things must be made to fit into certain boxes; actions 
need to be defined (as genocide, as a violation of a particular set of civil 
and political rights, as a violation of a particular article of a particular con-
vention). Human Rights Watch reports are legalistic documents, designed 
to be used as part of advocacy campaigns: here is what is happening, here 
is why it is happening, here are the people who are responsible, and here 
are the things that must be done to stop these abuses. The reports are sent 
out to journalists, senators, NGOs, and international donors. To be effec-
tive, they need to motivate those people to act, to write stories, to enact leg-
islation, to change their policies, and to give money. 
There are many other constraints, some very mundane. For instance, 
much of what ended up in the final version of this report came out of edito-
rial compromises. These reports have many editors, and the text that ulti-
mately gets published bears all the scars of the editing process. Similarly, 
the text is also constrained by organizational requirements; Human Rights 
Watch deals mainly with civil and political rights, and text sections that 
stray too far in the direction of murky social and economic rights are ruth-
lessly redirected. Finally, a legalistic standard of evidence prevails; if you 
did not see it yourself, and you did not hear about it from someone who 
saw it, the interesting rumors you have heard are not worth much.41 
Inevitably, many of the nuances get lost; inevitably, the story that is 
told can often distort as much as it clarifies. This is true not only of such 
highly constrained documents as human rights reports, but also of the most 
open-ended kinds of stories. Consider the stories I have told here: I started 
with a tear-jerker, a standard advocate's ploy. (What does one tell a weep-
ing child?) Was this a fair way to frame any of this? And was it fair to lump 
all anthropologists together and to come up with something labeled "the 
anthropological theory"? Was it fair to present so many fragments of chil-
dren's narratives, fragments that are themselves pieced together from con-
versations directed by my own questions, conversations which often 
required the assistance of an interpreter? 
I am not sure what to do about all these questions, for as I have said, I 
see the tension between the roles of scholar and activist as one that is per-
manent and real, rather than merely apparent. Ultimately, I think the best 
any of us can do is to present both our own judgments and generalizations 
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and to make available to as many people as possible the original words of 
our informants. There is something to be said for simply bearing witness in 
as honest a fashion as possible, for giving airspace to voices we normally 
do not hear. Thus, in our Human Rights Watch report, we used as many 
direct quotes as we could; a lengthy first section consists of narratives from 
the children we met. To the extent possible, we wanted our readers to be 
able to assess for themselves our conclusions and recommendations. We 
also wanted our readers to be able to read between the lines, to form for 
themselves some of the judgments we could not express-for one reason or 
another-in such a format. (For instance, I ended up feeling rather strongly 
that the Ugandan government has quite a bit to answer for, and that a nego-
tiated peace is the best hope for an end to the conflict. For many reasons, 
most of them probably good, little of this feeling could be directly 
expressed in the report. But I hope that we have provided enough in the 
way of quotes from others to enable readers to reach a decision about this 
for themselves.) 
I do not know how well we succeeded. I do not know how much our 
need to tell a coherent story, and work around organizational constraints, 
forced us to do violence to the complex and subtle truths about events in 
northern Uganda. Indeed, I worry about the opposite problem as well: I 
worry that our desire to be faithful to the complexities may have harmed 
our effort to give readers a coherent master narrative of events, something 
that will leave them as shaken and moved as our experiences left us, some-
thing that will motivate them to act to help northern Uganda's children. 
But there is, I think, no other way to proceed than by presenting our 
own stories-as partial and risky as they may be-with humility, and with 
hope. 
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